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Abstract
Several works have indicated the relationships between polynomially solvable combinatorial
optimization problems and the core non-emptiness of cooperative games associated with them,
and between intractable combinatorial optimization problems and the hardness of the problem to
decide the core non-emptiness of the associated games. In this paper, we study the core of a travel-
ing salesman game, which is associated with the traveling salesman problem. First, we show
that in general the problem to test the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game is
NP-hard. This corresponds to theNP-hardness of the traveling salesman problem. Second, we
show that the core of a traveling salesman game is non-empty if the distance matrix is a sym-
metric Monge matrix, and also that a traveling salesman game is submodular (or concave) if the
distance matrix is a Kalmanson matrix. These correspond to the fact that the Monge property
and the Kalmanson property are polynomially solvable special cases of the traveling salesman
problem.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background—combinatorial optimization games
Several works have indicated the relationship between polynomially solvable com-
binatorial optimization problems and the core non-emptiness of cooperative games
associated with them. Even the Drst example in the history of combinatorial optimiza-
tion games, due to Shapley–Shubik [62], Dtted into this framework. They introduced
the assignment games [62], which are derived from the assignment problem (or the
maximum weighted matching problem on bipartite graphs), and showed that the core
of an assignment game is always non-empty. Corresponding to this, the assignment
problem can be solved in polynomial time. The Drst polynomial time algorithm is due
to Kuhn [44] (which is called the Hungarian method) and other algorithms can be
found in a textbook of combinatorial optimization (like Korte–Vygen [42]). Another
early example is a minimum cost spanning tree game by Bird [3], which is based
on the minimum cost spanning tree problem. It was shown that every minimum cost
spanning tree game has a non-empty core, by constructing an explicit vector belong-
ing to the core [3,29]. Again, corresponding to this, the minimum cost spanning tree
problem can be solved in polynomial time by the algorithms, for example, due to
BorLuska [51], Kruskal [43] and Prim [59]. (A textbook of combinatorial optimization
like Korte–Vygen [42] provides a further account.)
In the proof of the core non-emptiness of an assignment game by Shapley–Shubik
[62], it was a key observation that the linear programming relaxation of the ordinary
integer programming formulation of the assignment problem always has an integral
optimal solution. In fact, the core of an assignment game is characterized as the set
of optimal solutions of the dual of the linear programming relaxation. Extending this
result, Deng–Ibaraki–Nagamochi [12] gave a necessary and suNcient condition for
maximum packing games and minimum covering games to have non-empty cores. It
says that the linear programming relaxation of a maximum packing problem (and a
minimum covering problem) has an integral optimal solution if and only if the as-
sociated game has a non-empty core, and if so the core is characterized by the set
of optimal solutions of the dual of the linear programming relaxation. It gives rise
to good characterizations for the core non-emptiness of some combinatorial optimiza-
tion games such as maximum matching games, minimum vertex cover games, maxi-
mum independent set games, etc. Similar results based on linear programming duality
were shown for other kinds of games as well. For facility location games, Kolen [40]
showed the core of an uncapacitated facility location game is non-empty if and only
if the linear programming relaxation has an integral optimal solution (see also [41]).
Chardaire [6] generalized Kolen’s results to some sorts of capacitated facility location
games, and Goemans–Skutella [26] characterized the more generalized facility location
games with non-empty cores, including the results by Kolen [40] and Chardaire [6].
(Note that a facility location game studied by these papers [6,26,40] is diPerent from a
location game of Tamir [66] and of Curiel [8].) For partition games, Faigle–Kern [18]
proved that the core is non-empty if and only if the linear programming relaxation
of the corresponding partition problem has an integral optimal solution. Moreover,
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Granot–Hamers–Tijs [28] investigated the core non-emptiness of delivery games in
relation with the structures of the underlying graphs. In the books by Bilbao [2] and
Curiel [8], we can Dnd a lot of results and properties of cooperative games associated
with combinatorial optimization problems, which we may call combinatorial optimiza-
tion games.
On the other hand, some papers have indicated the relationship between intractable
combinatorial optimization problems and the hardness of the problem to test the core
non-emptiness of cooperative games associated with them. For example, Deng–Ibaraki–
Nagamochi [12] showed that testing the core non-emptiness of a minimum coloring
game is NP-complete; Matsui [48] showed that testing the core non-emptiness of a
bin packing game is NP-complete; Goemans–Skutella [26] showed that testing the
core non-emptiness of a facility location game is NP-complete. Notice that Deng–
Ibaraki–Nagamochi [12] showed that for a minimum vertex cover game and a maximum
independent set game, we can test the core non-emptiness in polynomial time, while the
minimum vertex cover problem and the maximum independent set problem are known
to be NP-hard. Therefore, it is not always the case that, for a class of cooperative
games arising from an NP-hard optimization problem, testing the core non-emptiness
is hard. Note that Deng–Papadimitriou [13] also discussed cooperative games from the
computational (or algorithmic) point of view, not only for the cores but also for other
kinds of solution concepts.
1.2. Traveling salesman games
In this paper, we will study traveling salesman games, introduced by Potters–Curiel–
Tijs [58] from the viewpoint of Section 1.1. In the literature, some of the properties of
traveling salesman games were discussed. Tamir [65] showed that a metric traveling
salesman game with at most four players always has a non-empty core, and that there
exists a metric traveling salesman game with six players such that the core is empty.
Furthermore, Faigle–Fekete–HochstAattler–Kern [16] provided an instance of a traveling
salesman game in the 2-dimensional Euclidean space with six players such that the core
is empty. On the other hand, Kuipers [45] showed that a metric traveling salesman game
with Dve players always has a non-empty core. Also, Potters–Curiel–Tijs [58] gave an
example of an asymmetric traveling game with four players which has an empty core,
and provided some conditions for an asymmetric traveling salesman game to have a
non-empty core. In other papers [8,65], we can Dnd other conditions for a traveling
salesman game to have a non-empty core. On the other hand, approximation of the
core of a traveling salesman game was discussed by Faigle–Fekete–HochstAattler–Kern
[16] and Faigle–Kern [17].
Stimulated by a sort of the vehicle routing problems, Herer [31] initiated the study
of the underlying graph structure which always yields submodular traveling salesman
games. Such graphs are called naturally submodular. (The more precise deDnition will
be given in Section 6.5.5.) Herer–Penn [32] characterized undirected graphs which
are naturally submodular, and Granot–Granot–Zhu [27] characterized directed graphs
and bidirected graphs which are naturally submodular. In fact, submodularity, which is
also called concavity, is an important concept in cooperative game theory. First of all,
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submodularity implies core non-emptiness [61]. In addition, submodularity has other
good properties: for example, the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core [61]; the
core is a unique von Neumann–Morgenstern solution [61]; the bargaining set coincides
with the core and the kernel coincides with the nucleolus [47]; the -value can be
calculated in polynomial time [67]; the nucleolus can be calculated in polynomial time
[19,46]. Besides, submodularity plays an important role in the Delds of network Rows
and combinatorial optimization. Fujishige [23] provides a survey of submodular-type
optimization problems, and Murota [50] gives a further account on this topic.
1.3. Contributions of this paper
In this paper, we will show that in general the problem to test the core non-emptiness
of a given traveling salesman game isNP-hard. This corresponds to theNP-hardness
of the traveling salesman problem. Next, we will provide some conditions for a sym-
metric traveling salesman game to have a non-empty core, which are related to poly-
nomially solvable cases of the traveling salesman problems. First, we will show that
the core of a traveling salesman game is always non-empty if the distance matrix is a
symmetric Monge matrix. It is known that if the distance matrix is an (asymmetric)
Monge matrix then the traveling salesman problem can be solved in linear time in the
number of cities [55] while in general the traveling salesman problem is NP-hard
already for the 2-dimensional Euclidean case [54]. Second, we will show a traveling
salesman game is always submodular if the distance matrix is a Kalmanson matrix. The
Kalmanson property also yields a polynomially solvable special class of the traveling
salesman problem [38].
It is known that Monge matrices are related with polynomially solvable cases for
combinatorial optimization problems other than the traveling salesman problem, which
was surveyed by Burkard–Klinz–Rudolf [5]. On the other hand, there are many other
polynomially solvable cases of traveling salesman problems. They were surveyed in
[4,25], and some recent results appeared in [1,14,35–37,52], etc.
1.4. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to some deDnitions
and basic properties, and our results are described again in a more formal manner.
In Sections 3–5, we will provide the proofs of our results. Concluding remarks are
provided in the Dnal section.
2. Denitions and results
Let N0={0; 1; : : : ; n} and an N0×N0-matrix D be given. We treat N0 as a set of cities
and D as the distance matrix. We assume that the diagonal components of D are all
zero and the non-diagonal components of D are all positive, and in this paper we will
call a matrix D a distance matrix if D satisDes these assumptions. The (i; j)-component
of D is denoted by d[i; j]. Note that possibly a distance matrix D does not satisfy the
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triangle inequality: d[i; j] + d[j; k]¿d[i; k] for all i; j; k ∈N0. The traveling salesman
problem (TSP, for short) is the problem to Dnd a shortest tour around the cities in N0
with respect to a given distance matrix D; more formally, to Dnd a tour  on N0 to
minimize
n∑
i=0
d[i; (i)]; (1)
where (i) denotes the successor of i. We denote the kth successor and the kth prede-
cessor of i∈N0 in the tour  by k(i) and −k(i), respectively. A tour  is sometimes
denoted by = 〈0; (0); 2(0); : : : ; n(0)〉.
Let N = N0 \ {0}= {1; 2; : : : ; n} and D be an N0 × N0 distance matrix. We deDne a
function cD : 2N → R as follows. For S ⊆ N , cD(S) is the total distance of a shortest
tour around the cities in S ∪ {0} with respect to D. Notice that cD(∅)= 0. We call the
pair (N; cD) a traveling salesman game. In terminology of cooperative game theory, N
is called the set of players and cD is the characteristic function. In this paper, when
we consider traveling salesman games, we always assume that the distance matrix D is
symmetric, i.e., d[i; j]=d[j; i] for all i; j∈N0, unless stated otherwise. A traveling sales-
man game arises from the following cost allocation problem, originated in Fishburn–
Pollak [21]. A professor has visited, starting from his home institute 0, the universities
1; 2; : : : ; n which invited him and after the visits he has returned to his home. The total
cost of the trip should be paid by the inviting universities. The problem is to Dnd a
“fair” rule for the allocation of the total cost among these universities. Stimulated by
this example, we sometimes say that the city 0∈N0 (which is not a player) is the home.
In cooperative game theory, a core is frequently used as a fair allocation rule. For
a traveling salesman game (N; cD), the core is deDned as
Core(N; cD) =
{
x∈RN
∣∣∣∣∣
x(N ) = cD(N ) and;
x(S)6 cD(S) for all S ⊆ N
}
; (2)
where we use a convention that x(S) =
∑
i∈S x[i] (and x(∅) = 0) for a vector x∈RN .
See the chapters [39,56] for some properties of the core of a cooperative game.
As we can see from the deDnition, cores can be empty for some cases. This means
that in such cases we cannot Dnd a fair allocation by this rule. Hence, it is important
to test the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game. Our Drst theorem
is a solution to this algorithmic problem. Here is the theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities N0 with a symmetric
distance matrix D. Then, the problem to test the core non-emptiness of the traveling
salesman game (N; cD) is NP-hard.
This theorem implies that it is almost impossible to have a good characterization of
the core non-emptiness of a traveling salesman game in terms of distance matrices. So
we may only hope to determine some classes of matrices which give rise to non-empty
cores. The class of Monge matrices is one of such classes.
The Monge property is known as a polynomially solvable special case of TSP, while
TSP is NP-hard even if N0 is the set of points on the 2-dimensional plane and each
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Fig. 1. A pyramidal tour.
entry of D is deDned as the Euclidean distance between the corresponding two points
[54]. An N0 × N0 matrix D is a Monge matrix if D satisDes
d[i; k] + d[j; l]6d[i; l] + d[j; k] (3)
for all i¡ j and k ¡ l. If a matrix D is a Monge matrix, then it is also said to have
the Monge property. Note that a Monge matrix does not need to satisfy the triangle
inequality. As we can observe from the deDnition of a Monge matrix, the Monge
property is dependent on the order of the indices of a given matrix. To resolve this
dependency, we will use a permuted Monge matrix. An N0 × N0 matrix D is called a
permuted Monge matrix if there exists a permutation  on the indices N0 such that
the matrix whose (i; j)-component is d[(i); (j)] has the Monge property. Note that
we can determine that a given matrix is a permuted Monge matrix and if so we can
Dnd such a permutation which results in a Monge matrix in O(n2) [9]. See also [5].
It is well-known that Monge matrices are related to some polynomially solvable
combinatorial optimization problems [5]. The next proposition is a basic result on
Monge matrices and TSP. A tour 〈0; i1; i2; : : : ; ir ; n; j1; j2; : : : ; jn−r−1〉 on N0 is called a
pyramidal tour if i1¡i2¡ · · ·¡ir and j1¿j2¿ · · ·¿jn−r−1. Fig. 1 is an illustration
of a pyramidal tour. As we can see, in a pyramidal tour the cities i1; : : : ; ir are visited
on the way from the home 0 to n in a monotone manner and the cities j1; : : : ; jn−r−1
are visited on the way back from n to 0 also in a monotone manner.
Proposition 2 (Gilmore et al. [25]). Consider a traveling salesman problem on the
cities N0 with a distance matrix D. If D is a Monge matrix, then there exists a
shortest tour which is pyramidal.
Generally, a shortest pyramidal tour can be found in O(n2) by the dynamic program-
ming technique [25]. Moreover, Park [55] showed that a shortest pyramidal tour for
TSP with a Monge distance matrix can be found in O(n) time invoking the structure
of a Monge matrix. Therefore, TSP with a permuted Monge distance matrix can be
solved in polynomial time. 2
2 Note that some past works like [4] say that TSP with a permuted Monge distance matrix is NP-hard.
However, our deDnition of permuted Monge distance matrix is diPerent from that in Section 4 of [4]. So
there is no contradiction with what we have just described. Actually, in Section 4 of [4] a permuted Monge
matrix can have diPerent permutations on rows and columns, while our permuted Monge matrix must have
the same permutation on rows and columns. You should not be misled; in Section 2 of [4] a permuted
Monge matrix is deDned as the same as ours.
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Furthermore, for symmetric Monge matrices, Supnick [64] showed the following
proposition. For this case, even the concrete “shape” of a shortest tour can be deter-
mined. See also [4].
Proposition 3 (Supnick [64]). Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities
N0 with a distance matrix D. If D is a symmetric Monge matrix, then the tour
〈0; 2; 4; : : : ; n; : : : ; 5; 3; 1〉 is a shortest tour.
Proposition 3 will be useful for proving the next theorem. This theorem relates the
Monge property with the core non-emptiness of a traveling salesman game.
Theorem 4. Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities N0 = {0; 1; : : : ; n}
with a distance matrix D. If D is a symmetric permuted Monge matrix, then the
core of the traveling salesman game (N; cD) is non-empty. Furthermore, an element
in the core can be found in O(n2).
For a traveling salesman game (N; cD) and T ⊆ N , we deDne the subgame (T; c(T )D )
as c(T )D (S) = cD(S) for all S ⊆ T . Observe that if the distance matrix is a symmetric
Monge matrix, then every subgame of a traveling salesman game also has a non-empty
core. That is because every submatrix of a Monge matrix is also a Monge matrix and
because of Theorem 4. In cooperative game theory, a game with the property that
every subgame has a non-empty core is called totally balanced. Hence, the discussion
above immediately leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities N0 with a distance
matrix D. If D is a symmetric permuted Monge matrix, then the traveling salesman
game (N; cD) is totally balanced.
We have another property which yields a polynomially solvable case of TSP. That is
the Kalmanson property. Let D be an N0×N0 matrix. We call D a Kalmanson matrix
if D is symmetric and fulDlls the following: for every i¡ j¡k ¡l
d[i; j] + d[k; l]6d[i; k] + d[j; l]; (4)
d[i; l] + d[j; k]6d[i; k] + d[j; l]: (5)
We also say that D has the Kalmanson property if D is a Kalmanson matrix. Note
that the class of Kalmanson matrices and that of symmetric Monge matrices have no
inclusion relationship. The following proposition relates Kalmanson matrices to TSP.
Proposition 6 (Kalmanson [38]). Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities
N0 with a distance matrix D. If D is a Kalmanson matrix, then the tour 〈0; 1; 2; 3; : : : ; n〉
is a shortest tour.
We can deDne permuted Kalmanson matrices similarly to permuted Monge matri-
ces. Namely, a matrix D is called a permuted Kalmanson matrix if there exists a
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permutation  on the indices N0 such that the matrix whose (i; j)-component is d[(i);
(j)] has the Kalmanson property. Note that we can determine that a given matrix is
a permuted Kalmanson matrix and if so we can Dnd a permutation which results in a
Kalmanson matrix in O(n2 log n) [7,10].
There is another important relation between TSP and the Kalmanson property: the
master tour problem. A tour  on N0 is a master tour if, for any T ⊆ N0, a shortest
tour on T is obtained by removal of the cities not in T from . Note that, in particular,
a master tour on N0 itself is a shortest tour on N0. For example, if the cities lie in a
convex position on the plane and the distance is measured by the Euclidean metric, the
tour along the boundary of the convex hull of the cities is a master tour. The master
tour problem is the problem of deciding whether the cities have a master tour with
respect to a given distance matrix. The next proposition states that a master tour exists
if and only if the distance matrix is a permuted Kalmanson matrix.
Proposition 7 (Burkard et al. [4], DeVWneko et al. [10]). Consider a traveling salesman
problem on the cities N0 with a symmetric distance matrix D. The tour 〈0; 1; 2; : : : ; n−
1; n〉 is a master tour if and only if D is a Kalmanson matrix.
We will prove the next theorem by using Proposition 6. A traveling salesman game
(N; cD) is submodular or concave if cD(S) + cD(T )¿ cD(S ∪ T ) + cD(S ∩ T ) for any
S; T ⊆ N . Submodular games have a bunch of important properties (see Section 1.2).
Theorem 8. Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities N0 with a distance
matrix D. Then the traveling salesman game (N; cD) is submodular if D is a permuted
Kalmanson matrix.
Note that submodularity implies total balancedness [61]. Potters [57] shows that if the
cities have a master tour, the (asymmetric) traveling salesman game has a non-empty
core and that for a special subcase the game is submodular. When we concentrate on
the symmetric case, we can Dnd that Theorem 8 is a stronger statement than the above
argument by Potters [57] with help of Proposition 7.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove Theorems 1, 4 and 8. Some additional
remarks will be provided in the Dnal section.
3. Proof of Theorem 1
First we will state the problem more formally.
Problem. CORE NON-EMPTINESS OF TRAVELING SALESMAN GAMES.
Instance. Cities N0 and an N0 × N0 symmetric distance matrix D.
Question. Is the core of the traveling salesman game (N; cD) non-empty?
Theorem 1 states the NP-hardness of CORE NON-EMPTINESS OF TRAVELING SALESMAN
GAMES. To prove that, we use HAMILTONIAN PATH, a famous NP-complete problem.
Problem. HAMILTONIAN PATH.
Instance. A graph G = (V; E).
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Question. Does G have a Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path which visits each vertex
exactly once (i.e., a simple spanning path)?
Proof of Theorem 1. We reduce HAMILTONIAN PATH to CORE NON-EMPTINESS OF TRAVELING
SALESMAN GAMES. For a given graph G=(V; E), put N=V={1; : : : ; n} and N0=N∪{0}.
We deDne an N0 × N0 symmetric distance matrix D as
d[i; j] =


0 (i = j);
n=(n+ 1) ({i; j}∈E; or exactly one of i and j is 0);
2 (otherwise):
Let (N; cD) be a traveling salesman game derived from the cities N0 and the distance
matrix D. We now show that G has a Hamiltonian path if and only if the game (N; cD)
has a non-empty core, which completes the reduction.
First, assume that G has a Hamiltonian path. Then we have cD(N )=n, cD(∅)=0, and
cD(S)¿ n(|S|+1)=(n+1) for all S ∈ 2N \{∅; N}. DeDne x=(x[1]; : : : ; x[n]) as x[i]=1
for all i∈N . Since x(N ) = n= cD(N ) and x(S) = |S|6 n(|S|+1)=(n+1)6 cD(S) for
all S ∈N \ {∅}, We can see that x belongs to the core.
Next, assume that G has no Hamiltonian path. Let
= 〈0; (0); 2(0); : : : ; n(0)〉
be a shortest tour on N0. For the convenience, let us assume that i(0)= i without loss
of generality. We deDne a subgraph G˜ = (N; E˜) of G as E˜ = E ∩ {{i; i + 1} : i∈V}.
Namely E˜ is the set of edges of G which appear in the tour . Let P be the vertices
of a longest path in G˜ and l and m be the endpoints of P, where l¡m. Since G has
no Hamiltonian path and G˜ is a subgraph of G, G˜ has no Hamiltonian path either.
This implies that P = N , namely l = 1 or m = n holds. Also we have
cD(N ) = d[0; 1] +
n−1∑
i=1
d[i; i + 1] + d[n; 0]
(clearly from the assumption that i(0) = i) and
cD(P) = d[0; l] +
m−1∑
i=l
d[i; i + 1] + d[m; 0]
(since the distances involved in this expression are all n=(n+ 1) by the choice of P).
Now, we claim the following.
Claim 9. It holds that cD(P)¡cD(N )− cD(N \ P).
Proof of Claim 9. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Both l = 1 and m = n hold. Fig. 2 illustrates the situation.
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Fig. 2. Case 1 in the proof of Claim 9.
Since P is a longest path in G˜, we have d[l − 1; l] = d[m;m + 1] = 2. Consider a
tour ′ = 〈0; 1; : : : ; l− 1; m+ 1; : : : ; n〉 on (N \ P) ∪ {0}. Then we have
cD(N \ P)6 the total distance of tour ′
= d[0; 1] +
l−2∑
i=1
d[i; i + 1]
+d[l− 1; m+ 1] +
n−1∑
i=m+1
d[i; i + 1] + d[n; 0]
=
(
d[0; 1] +
n−1∑
i=1
d[i; i + 1] + d[n; 0]
)
−
(
d[0; l] +
m−1∑
i=l
d[i; i + 1] + d[m; 0]
)
+d[0; l] + d[m; 0]− d[l− 1; l]− d[m;m+ 1]
+d[l− 1; m+ 1]
= cD(N )− cD(P) + 2 nn+ 1 − 2− 2 + d[l− 1; m+ 1]
6 cD(N )− cD(P) + 2 nn+ 1 − 2− 2 + 2
¡cD(N )− cD(P):
Thus, we have cD(P)¡cD(N )− cD(N \ P) as desired.
Case 2: Either l= 1 or m= n holds, but not both.
Without loss of generality, we assume that l = 1 holds. (If not, we turn  in the
reverse order to make l= 1 hold.) Fig. 3 depicts the situation.
Since P is a longest path in G˜, we have d[m;m+1]=2. Consider a tour ′=〈0; m+1;
m+ 2; : : : ; n〉 on (N \ P) ∪ {0}. Then we have
cD(N \ P)6 the total distance of tour ′
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Fig. 3. Case 2 in the proof of Claim 9.
= d[0; m+ 1] +
n−1∑
i=m+1
d[i; i + 1] + d[n; 0]
=
(
d[0; 1] +
n−1∑
i=1
d[i; i + 1] + d[n; 0]
)
−
(
d[0; l] +
m−1∑
i=l
d[i; i + 1] + d[m; 0]
)
+d[m; 0] + d[0; m+ 1]− d[m;m+ 1]
= cD(N )− cD(P) + 2 nn+ 1 − 2
¡cD(N )− cD(P):
Thus, we have cD(P)¡cD(N )− cD(N \ P) as expected.
In both cases, it holds that cD(P)¡cD(N )− cD(N \ P). In this way, the claim has
been proved.
Let us go back to the proof of Theorem 1. Now, suppose that the core is non-empty,
i.e., there exists x∈RN such that x(N )= cD(N ) and x(S)6 cD(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Particularly, we have x(P)6 cD(P) and x(N \ P)6 cD(N \ P). Then we obtain
x(N ) = x(P) + x(N \ P)6 cD(P) + cD(N \ P)¡cD(N )
using Claim 9 at the last inequality. This contradicts the assumption that x(N )=cD(N ).
Hence the core is empty. Thus we have Dnished the reduction.
4. Proof of Theorem 4
Now we will give a proof of Theorem 4. In the proof, we will explicitly construct
a vector belonging to the core, and this construction can be done in O(n2).
Proof of Theorem 4. Let D be an N0×N0 permuted Monge matrix and assume that N0
is renumbered by a permutation  so that D is a Monge matrix. Here, let h=−1(0)∈N0
be the home. So the set of players is N0 \ {h}. Set Nh0 = N0 \ {h} and consider the
traveling salesman game (Nh0 ; cD).
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We use the induction in terms of the number of players, i.e., the size of Nh0 .
Fix a linear order 4 on Nh0 . DeDne the marginal contribution m
cD
4 [i] of a player
i∈Nh0 with respect to a linear order 4 as
mcD4 [i] = cD(X4(i))− cD(X4(i) \ {i});
where X4(i)={j∈Nh0 : j 4 i}. We treat mcD4 as a vector whose ith component is mcD4 [i],
and call it the marginal contribution vector with respect to 4. Note that i∈X4(i) and
mcD4 (N
h
0 ) = cD(N
h
0 ) for any linear order 4. (Remember our convention that m
cD
4 (S) =∑
i∈S m
cD
4 [i] for S ⊆ Nh0 .)
Now we will construct the marginal contribution vector with respect to a suitable
linear order and will show that this vector belongs to the core. For a Monge matrix,
we can compute cD(S) for any S ⊆ Nh0 in polynomial time, hence this gives rise to
a polynomial-time algorithm to Dnd a vector in the core. (The detail will be given at
the end of the proof.)
Take a linear order 4 on Nh0 determined as h−1 4 h−2 4 · · · 4 1 4 0 4 h+1 4
h + 2 4 · · · 4 n, and consider the marginal contribution vector mcD4 with respect to
this order.
As the base case of our induction, we can easily verify that mcD4 belongs to the core
when n= 1.
As the induction hypothesis, we assume that the marginal contribution vector mcD4
with respect to this order belongs to the core when |Nh0 |¡n. Now we show that this
vector belongs to the core when |Nh0 |= n.
Since mcD4 is a marginal contribution vector, we have m
cD
4 (N
h
0 ) = cD(N
h
0 ). Hence it
suNces to show that mcD4 (S)6 cD(S) for every S ⊆ Nh0 .
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: h= n.
From the induction hypothesis, we have mcD4 (S)6 cD(S) for S ⊆ Nh0 \ {0}. So it
suNces to show that mcD4 (S ∪ {0})6 cD(S ∪ {0}) for S ⊆ Nh0 \ {0}.
Here, from the induction hypothesis and the deDnition of the marginal contribution,
we have mcD4 (S∪{0})=mcD4 (S)+mcD4 [0]6 cD(S)+mcD4 [0]=cD(S)+cD(Nh0 )−cD(Nh0 \{0}).
Moreover, by Proposition 3 and the appropriate choice of pyramidal tours, we have
cD(Nh0 )− cD(Nh0 \ {0})=d[0; 1]+d[0; 2]−d[1; 2] and cD(S ∪{0})− cD(S)=d[0; i1]+
d[0; i2]−d[i1; i2], where S is represented as {i1; i2; : : : ; is} with i1¡i2¡ · · ·¡is. There-
fore, what we want to show is now replaced to d[0; i1] + d[0; i2]− d[i1; i2]− d[0; 1]−
d[0; 2] + d[1; 2]¿ 0.
We consider the following four subcases.
Case 1-1: i1 = 1 and i2 = 2.
We have d[0; i1] + d[0; i2]− d[i1; i2]− d[0; 1]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = d[0; 1] + d[0; 2]−
d[1; 2]− d[0; 1]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = 0.
Case 1-2: i1 = 1 and i2¿ 2.
We have d[0; i1] + d[0; i2]− d[i1; i2]− d[0; 1]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = d[0; 1] + d[0; i2]−
d[1; i2]− d[0; 1]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = d[0; i2]− d[1; i2]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2]¿ 0, using the
Monge property of D.
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Case 1-3: i1 = 2 and i2¿ 2.
We have d[0; i1] + d[0; i2]− d[i1; i2]− d[0; 1]− d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = d[0; 2] + d[0; i2]−
d[2; i2] − d[0; 1] − d[0; 2] + d[1; 2] = d[0; i2] − d[2; i2] − d[0; 1] + d[1; 2] = d[0; i2] −
d[2; i2]− d[0; 1] + d[2; 1]¿ 0, using the Monge property and the symmetry of D.
Case 1-4: i1¿ 2 and i2¿i1.
We have d[0; i1]+d[0; i2]−d[i1; i2]−d[0; 1]−d[0; 2]+d[1; 2]= (d[0; i1]+d[1; 2]−
d[0; 2] − d[1; i1]) + (d[1; i1] + d[0; i2] − d[0; 1] − d[i1; i2])¿ 0 + (d[i1; 1] + d[0; i2] −
d[0; 1]− d[i1; i2])¿ 0, using the Monge property and the symmetry of D.
Thus, we are done for Case 1.
Case 2: h¡n.
From the induction hypothesis, we have mcD4 (S)6 cD(S) for S ⊆ Nh0 \ {n}. So it
suNces to show that mcD4 (S ∪ {n})6 cD(S ∪ {n}) for S ⊆ Nh0 \ {n}.
Here, from the induction hypothesis and the deDnition of the marginal contribution,
we have mcD4 (S∪{n})=mcD4 (S)+mcD4 [n]6 cD(S)+mcD4 [n]=cD(S)+cD(Nh0 )−cD(Nh0 \{n}).
Moreover, by Proposition 3 and the appropriate choice of pyramidal tours, we have
cD(Nh0 )− cD(Nh0 \ {n}) = d[n− 2; n] + d[n− 1; n]− d[n− 2; n− 1] and cD(S ∪ {n})−
cD(S) = d[is−1; n] + d[is; n] − d[is−1; is], where S is represented as {i1; i2; : : : ; is} with
i1¡i2¡ · · ·¡is. Therefore, what we want to show is now replaced to d[is−1; n] +
d[is; n]− d[is−1; is]− d[n− 2; n]− d[n− 1; n] + d[n− 2; n− 1]¿ 0.
We consider the following four subcases.
Case 2-1: is = n− 1 and is−1 = n− 2.
We have d[is−1; n]+d[is; n]−d[is−1; is]−d[n− 2; n]−d[n− 1; n]+d[n− 2; n− 1]=
d[n− 2; n]+d[n− 1; n]−d[n− 2; n− 1]−d[n− 2; n]−d[n− 1; n]+d[n− 2; n− 1]=0.
Case 2-2: is = n− 1 and is−1¡n− 2.
We have d[is−1; n]+d[is; n]−d[is−1; is]−d[n− 2; n]−d[n− 1; n]+d[n− 2; n− 1]=
d[is−1; n] + d[n − 1; n] − d[is−1; n − 1] − d[n − 2; n] − d[n − 1; n] + d[n − 2; n − 1] =
d[is−1; n]− d[is−1; n− 1]− d[n− 2; n] + d[n− 2; n− 1]¿ 0, using the Monge property
of D.
Case 2-3: is = n− 2 and is−1¡n− 2.
We have d[is−1; n]+d[is; n]−d[is−1; is]−d[n− 2; n]−d[n− 1; n]+d[n− 2; n− 1]=
d[is−1; n] + d[n − 2; n] − d[is−1; n − 2] − d[n − 2; n] − d[n − 1; n] + d[n − 2; n − 1] =
d[is−1; n]− d[is−1; n− 2]− d[n− 1; n] + d[n− 1; n− 2]¿ 0, using the Monge property
and the symmetry of D.
Case 2-4: is ¡n− 2 and is−1¡is.
We have d[is−1; n]+d[is; n]−d[is−1; is]−d[n− 2; n]−d[n− 1; n]+d[n− 2; n− 1]=
(d[is−1; n] + d[n− 1; is]− d[is−1; is]− d[n− 1; n]) + (d[is; n] + d[n− 2; n− 1]− d[is; n−
1]− d[n− 2; n])¿ 0, using the Monge property and the symmetry of D.
Thus, we are done for Case 2 as well, and we can conclude that mcD4 belongs to the
core. Now we will show that mcD4 can be computed in O(n
2). An algorithm will look
as follows.
(1) First, Dnd a permutation  such that the matrix resulting from  is a permuted
Monge matrix. This can be done in O(n2) [5,9].
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(2) Next, compute cD(X4(i)) for each i∈Nh0 . Each of these values is the optimal value
for an instance of TSP with the symmetric Monge property. In each instance we
just need to look up at most n + 1 entries of D due to Proposition 3. In total, it
requires O(n2).
Therefore, in total, this algorithm runs in O(n2) + O(n2) = O(n2).
5. Proof of Theorem 8
In this section we prove Theorem 8. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.
First, notice that the submodularity of cD is equivalent to the following condition: for
all S ⊆ N such that |S|¿ 2 and distinct i; j∈ S
cD(S \ {i}) + cD(S \ {j})¿ cD(S) + cD(S \ {i; j}):
We use this fact in order to shorten the proof.
Proof of Theorem 8. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, we assume that N0 is renum-
bered by a permutation  so that D is a Kalmanson matrix. Here, let h= −1(0)∈N0
be the home and regard Nh0 = N0 \ {h} as the set of the players. Choose arbitrarily
S = {i1; : : : ; is} ⊆ Nh0 where i1¡i2¡ · · ·¡is and distinct i; j∈ S. Assume that i¡ j
without loss of generality. For k ∈ S, deDne Pred(k) = max{l∈ S ∪ {h} : l¡k} and
Succ(k) = min{l∈ S ∪ {h} : l¿k}.
We consider the following three cases. Note that every submatrix of a Kalmanson
matrix is also a Kalmanson matrix.
Case 1: h¡ i1.
It has three subcases.
Case 1-1: h¡ i16 i¡Succ(i)¡j6 is.
By Proposition 6, we can easily see that cD(S\{i})+cD(S\{j})=cD(S)+cD(S\{i; j}).
Case 1-2: h¡ i16 i¡Succ(i) = j¡ is.
By Proposition 6, we have (cD(S)+cD(S\{i; j}))−(cD(S\{i})+cD(S\{j}))=d[i; j]+
d[Pred(i);Succ(j)] − d[Pred(i); j] − d[i;Succ(j)]6 0. Here, we used the Kalmanson
property (inequality (5)).
Case 1-3: h¡ i16 i¡Succ(i) = j = is.
By Proposition 6, we have (cD(S) + cD(S \ {i; j}))− (cD(S \ {i}) + cD(S \ {j})) =
d[i; j]+d[h;Pred(i)]−d[Pred(i); j]−d[h; i]6 0. Here, we used the Kalmanson property
(inequality (4)).
Case 2: i1¡h¡is.
It has two subcases.
Case 2-1: i1 = i¡Succ(i)6 h6Pred(j)¡j = is.
By Proposition 6, we have (cD(S)+cD(S\{i; j}))−(cD(S\{i})+cD(S\{j}))=d[i; j]+
d[Succ(i);Pred(j)] − d[Succ(i); j] − d[i;Pred(j)]6 0. Here, we used the Kalmanson
property (inequality (5)).
Case 2-2: Other situations from Case 2-1.
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By Proposition 6, we can see that cD(S \ {i}) + cD(S \ {j}) = cD(S) + cD(S \ {i; j}).
Case 3: is ¡h.
It has three subcases.
Case 3-1: i16 i¡Succ(i)¡j6 is ¡h.
By Proposition 6, we can see that cD(S \ {i}) + cD(S \ {j}) = cD(S) + cD(S \ {i; j}).
Case 3-2: i1¡i¡Succ(i) = j6 is ¡h.
By Proposition 6, we have (cD(S)+cD(S\{i; j}))−(cD(S\{i})+cD(S\{j}))=d[i; j]+
d[Pred(i);Succ(j)] − d[Pred(i); j] − d[i;Succ(j)]6 0. Here, we used the Kalmanson
property (inequality (5)).
Case 3-3: i1 = i¡Succ(i) = j6 is ¡h.
By Proposition 6, we have (cD(S) + cD(S \ {i; j}))− (cD(S \ {i}) + cD(S \ {j})) =
d[i; j]+d[Succ(j); h]−d[j; h]−d[i;Succ(j)]6 0. Here, we used the Kalmanson property
(inequality (4)).
This completes the proof.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered the core of a symmetric traveling salesman game.
We have proved that the problem to test the core non-emptiness of a given traveling
salesman game isNP-hard. Moreover, we have proved that a traveling salesman game
is totally balanced if the distance matrix is a permuted symmetric Monge matrix, and
that a traveling salesman game is submodular if the distance matrix is a permuted
Kalmanson matrix.
Now we will make some remarks.
6.1. Non-necessity of the Monge property for total balancedness
We have proved that a traveling salesman game is totally balanced if the dis-
tance matrix is a Monge matrix. However, the Monge property is not necessary for
the total balancedness of traveling salesman games. For example, let N0 = {0; 1; 2; 3}
and
D =


0 3 1 3
3 0 3 6
1 3 0 3
3 6 3 0


:
Here, we have cD({1}) = cD({3}) = 6, cD({2}) = 2, cD({1; 2}) = cD({2; 3}) = 7,
cD({1; 3}) = cD({1; 2; 3}) = 12. Therefore, we can see that this game is totally bal-
anced. However, D is not a permuted Monge matrix.
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6.2. Non-su;ciency of the Monge property for submodularity
We have an example which says that the Monge property does not imply the sub-
modularity of the traveling salesman game, as follows: N0 = {0; 1; 2; 3; 4} and
D =


0 1 2 3 5
1 0 1 2 3
2 1 0 1 2
3 2 1 0 1
5 3 2 1 0


:
Choose S= {1; 2; 4} and T = {1; 3; 4}. Then we have cD(S)= cD(T )= cD(S ∩T )=8
and cD(S ∪ T ) = 9. Therefore, cD(S) + cD(T )¡cD(S ∪ T ) + cD(S ∩ T ), but it can be
easily veriDed that D has the Monge property.
6.3. Other polynomially solvable special cases
Propositions 2 and 6 say that there exists a shortest tour which is pyramidal for the
TSP with the Monge property or the Kalmanson property. In addition, there are other
classes of distance matrices which derive a similar result. We can Dnd some of them in
[1,4,14,25,52]. So, we might ask if these other classes also yield the associated traveling
salesman games with non-empty cores. For a symmetric TSP, we have symmetric
Demidenko matrices and van der Veen matrices as polynomially solvable cases, for
example. A matrix D is a symmetric Demidenko matrix if D is symmetric and satisDes
for any i¡ j¡j + 1¡l
d[i; j] + d[j + 1; l]6d[i; j + 1] + d[j; l]: (6)
Similarly, a symmetric matrix D is a van der Veen matrix if for any i¡ j¡j+1¡l
d[i; j] + d[j + 1; l]6d[i; l] + d[j; j + 1]: (7)
Consider a symmetric TSP on the cities N0 with a symmetric distance matrix D. If D
is a symmetric Demidenko matrix, then there exists a shortest tour which is pyramidal
[11]. Also, if D is a van der Veen matrix, then there exists a shortest tour which is
pyramidal [68]. Here we remark that there exists an instance of traveling salesman
games with a symmetric Demidenko matrix or a van der Veen matrix such that the
core is empty. Here is such an instance: N0 = {0; 1; 2; 3} and
D =


0 1 1 1
1 0 3 3
1 3 0 3
1 3 3 0

 :
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We can see that D is symmetric and satisDes conditions (6) and (7). So D is a
symmetric Demidenko matrix and also a van der Veen matrix. We now show that D
implies core-emptiness. Suppose that the core is non-empty, that is, we have a vector
x∈R3 such that x({1; 2; 3}) = cD({1; 2; 3}) and x(S)6 cD(S) for all S ⊆ {1; 2; 3}.
We can observe that cD({1}) = 2, cD({2; 3}) = 5 and cD({1; 2; 3}) = 8. Therefore,
x({1; 2; 3}) = x({1}) + x({2; 3})6 cD({1}) + cD({2; 3}) = 2 + 5¡ 8 = cD({1; 2; 3}),
which contradicts x({1; 2; 3}) = cD({1; 2; 3}). Hence, the core is empty.
6.4. Relationship with the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem
As a consequence of Theorem 8, we can see that the Kalmanson property forms a
polynomially solvable case of the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem. Let N0
be the cities and D be an N0×N0 distance matrix. In addition, we have a non-negative
vector p∈RN which represents a reward or a prize associated with each city. Let
(N; cD) be a traveling salesman game. A prize-collecting traveling salesman prob-
lem is the problem to Dnd a subtour starting from 0 which maximizes the sum of
the prizes on the visited cities minus the total length of the subtour; more formally,
to Dnd max{p(S) − cD(S) : S ⊆ N}, where p(S) =
∑
i∈S p[i]. DeDne a function
g : 2N → R as g(S) = cD(S)− p(S) for every S ∈ 2N . Then the problem is equivalent
to −min{g(S) : S ⊆ N}. If D is a permuted Kalmanson matrix, then cD is submodular
(Theorem 8), therefore g is also submodular. So a minimizer of g can be obtained
by an algorithm for the submodular function minimization problem. See [30,33,34,60]
for algorithms to solve the submodular function minimization problem in strongly poly-
nomial time. Algorithms for the submodular function minimization problem are
surveyed by Fleischer [22], and Fujishige [24].
6.5. Open problems
Here, we will state some open problems related to the work in this paper.
6.5.1. The asymmetric Monge property
In this paper, we have proved that a traveling salesman game with the symmetric
Monge property has a non-empty core. So a natural question is about the asymmetric
case. We did not know that a traveling salesman game with the asymmetric Monge
property has a non-empty core or not.
6.5.2. Characterizations of totally balanced and submodular traveling salesman
games
Another open problem is to characterize totally balanced traveling salesman games
or submodular traveling salesman games in terms of distance matrices. Possibly, the
decision problems like “is a given traveling salesman game totally balanced?” or “is
a given traveling salesman game submodular?” are intractable, which implies that the
good characterizations are beyond reach. For a Steiner tree game (which is also called
a minimum cost spanning network game) introduced by Megiddo [49], Fang–Cai–
Deng [20] proved that deciding the total balancedness of a given Steiner tree game is
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NP-hard. This is the only known result on hardness of deciding the total balancedness
of a class of combinatorial optimization games. Furthermore, as far as the author knows,
there is no hardness result on deciding the submodularity (or the supermodularity) of a
class of combinatorial optimization games. Note that the supermodularity of assignment
games is characterized by Solymosi–Raghavan [63], and the submodularity of minimum
coloring games and minimum vertex cover games is characterized by Okamoto [53].
6.5.3. Testing membership in the core
Faigle–Fekete–HochstAattler–Kern [15] studied the complexity of testing membership
in the core of minimum cost spanning tree games and showed that this problem is
coNP-complete. Also, Fang–Cai–Deng [20] showed that testing membership in the
core of Steiner tree games with non-empty cores is coNP-hard. For us, how about
testing membership in the core of traveling salesman games? Even in the general case
we do not know the complexity. To be precise, we will state what is the problem
exactly.
Problem. TESTING MEMBERSHIP IN THE CORE OF TRAVELING SALESMAN GAMES.
Instance. Cities N0, an N0 × N0 distance matrix D and a vector x∈RN satisfying
x(N ) = cD(N ).
Question. Does x belong to the core of the traveling salesman game (N; cD)?
We leave the complexity issue of this problem as an open problem.
6.5.4. Core non-emptiness for the metric case
As Theorem 1, we proved that deciding the core non-emptiness of a given traveling
salesman game is NP-hard. However, the reduction in the proof was not adapted
to the metric case (in which the distance matrix satisDes the triangle inequality) or
the 2-dimensional Euclidean case. It is very plausible that the metric case and the
2-dimensional Euclidean case are also NP-hard. So, we will describe that as a con-
jecture.
Conjecture 10. The problem of testing the core non-emptiness of a given metric trav-
eling salesman game is NP-hard. This is NP-hard even for the 2-dimensional
Euclidean case.
6.5.5. Naturally balanced and naturally totally balanced graphs
Herer [31], Herer–Penn [32] and Granot–Granot–Zhu [27] studied the underlying
graph structure which always yields a submodular traveling salesman game. This kind
of graphs are called naturally submodular. So, it is interesting to investigate “naturally
balanced” graphs or “naturally totally balanced” graphs. To state a problem precisely,
we will give the deDnitions. We are given a graph G = (V; E) and a non-negative
weight function f :E → R associated with each edge of the graph. Then, we construct
a traveling salesman game (N; cD) as follows. First we Dx a vertex v∈V as the home,
then N = V \ {v}. Each entry d[i; j] of the distance matrix D is determined as the
length of a shortest path from i to j in G. The characteristic function cD is deDned
as explained in Section 2 where the home is now v. A graph G = (V; E) is called
naturally submodular if for any v∈V and any non-negative weight function f the
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game (N; cD) is submodular. Natural submodularity is characterized by Herer–Penn
[32] for undirected graphs and by Granot–Granot–Zhu [27] for directed graphs and
bidirected graphs. Analogously we may deDne a naturally balanced graph as a graph
which yields a traveling salesman game with a non-empty core for any choice of the
home v∈V and any non-negative function f. A naturally totally balanced graph can
be deDned similarly. Now, our open problem is to characterize the naturally balanced
graphs and the naturally totally balanced graphs. Note that a similar investigation was
provided for delivery games by Granot–Hamers–Tijs [28].
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